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Abstract
Due to the evolving nature of power systems and the complicated coupling relationship of power
devices, it has been a great challenge to identify the contingencies that could trigger cascading black-
outs of power systems. This paper provides an effective approach to identifying the initial contin-
gency in power transmission networks, which are equipped with flexible alternating current trans-
mission system (FACTS) devices, high-voltage direct current (HVDC) links and protective relays.
Essentially, the problem of contingency identification is formulated in the framework of nonlinear
programming, which can be solved by the Jacobian-Free Newton-Krylov (JFNK) method to cir-
cumvent Jacobian matrix and reduce the computational cost. Notably, the proposed identification
approach is also applied to complicated cascading failure models of power systems. Finally, numer-
ical simulations are carried out to validate the proposed identification approach on IEEE 118 Bus
Systems. The proposed approach succeeds in reconciling the rigorous optimization formulation with
the practical modeling of cascading blackouts.
Keywords: Cascading failures, contingency identification, power transmission networks, nonlinear
programming
1 Introduction
The past decades have witnessed several large blackouts in the world such as India Blackout (2012),
US-Canada Blackout (2003), Italy Blackout (2003) and Southern Brazil Blackout (1999) to name just
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a few, which have left millions of residents without power supply and caused huge financial losses [1].
In such catastrophe events, the initial contingencies (e.g. extreme weather, terrorist attack and operator
error) play a crucial role in triggering the cascading outage of power systems. It is reported that the mal-
operation of a protection relay is the key “trigger” of the final line outage sequence in most blackouts
[2]. For instance, conventional relays may lead to unselective tripping under high load conditions, which
could initiate the chain reaction of branch outages under certain conditions (e.g., a wrong relay operation
of Sammis-Star line in the 2003 US-Canada Blackout [2]). The reliability and resilience of power grids
are closely related to the proactive elimination of disruptive initial contingencies. Thus, it is vital to
identify the initial contingency that causes the most severe blackouts and work out remedial schemes
against cascading blackouts in advance.
In practice, electrical power devices such as FACTS devices, HVDC links and protective relays serve
as the major protective barrier against cascading blackouts. To be specific, FACTS devices significantly
contribute to the stability improvement of power systems, while HVDC links behave like a “firewall”
to prevent the propagation of cascading outages. Actually, the FACTS devices have been widely in-
stalled in power transmission networks to improve the capability of power transmission, controllability
of power flow, damping of power oscillation and post-contingency stability. As a series FACTS de-
vice, the thyristor-controlled series capacitor (TCSC) allows fast and continuous adjustments of branch
impedance in order to control the power flow and improve the transient stability [3]. In addition, the
HVDC links assist in preventing cascades propagation and restoring the power flow after faults. For
example, Que´bec power system in Canada survived the cascades in the 2003 US-Canada Blackout due to
its DC interconnection to the US power systems [2]. As the most common protection device, protective
relays of power system react passively to the system oscillation and promptly remove the overloading
elements without affecting the normal operation of the rest of the system. Meanwhile it allows for time
delay of abnormal oscillations to neglect the trivial disturbances and avoid the overreaction to the tran-
sient state changes [4]. It is necessary to take into account the protection mechanism of the above power
devices for the practical cascading dynamics of power systems.
Owing to simplicity, efficiency and scalability in the simulation, the DC power flow model has been
widely adopted to investigate cascading failures of power systems [5, 6]. It is demonstrated that the DC
power flow model is able to assess the vulnerability of power grids and reveal informative details of
cascading failure process, including the size, contributing factors and the duration of cascading failures
[6]. Additionally, the model predictive control can be applied to mitigate the cascading effect of severe
line-overload disturbances in power systems [5]. Actually, the DC power flow model is usually regarded
as a good substitute for the AC based model in high voltage power transmission networks [7, 8]. As
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a result, the DC power flow equation is employed in this work to compute the transmission power on
branches of power transmission networks.
So far, cascading blackouts of power systems have been investigated through two distinct routes.
Specifically, some researchers aim at the strict mathematical formulation for the exploration of vulnerable
elements in power systems regardless of the transient response and protection mechanisms [5, 9], while
others focus on the practical physical process and accurate modeling of cascading blackouts [4, 6]. While
the former may fail to reflect the real physical characteristic of cascading failures, the latter is in lack
of a rigorous theoretical framework. This work attempts to fill the gap between the practical modeling
of cascading blackouts and the strict mathematical formulation by properly decoupling the optimization
problem and cascading dynamics of power grids. The main contributions of this paper are listed as
follows
1. Propose the cascading dynamics of power transmission networks equipped with FACTS devices,
HVDC links and protective relays.
2. Formulate the problem of contingency identification with nonlinear programming and solve it via
the efficient numerical method.
3. Validate the proposed approach on the large-scale power transmission networks using different
protection schemes.
The outline of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the cascading dynamics of
power transmission networks. Section 3 provides the optimization formulation and theoretical results
on the contingency identification, followed by numerical methods in Section 4. Next, the identification
approach is validated in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper and discuss future work in Section 6.
2 Cascading Dynamics
This section aims to characterize the cascading evolution of power transmission networks subject to the
initial contingency and system stresses. Figure 1 presents the cascading process of power systems after
the initial contingency is added on the system. First of all, the FACTS devices take effect to adjust the
branch admittance and balance the power flow for relieving the stress of power networks. If the stress
is not eliminated, protective relays will be activated to serve the overloading branches on the condition
that the timer of circuit breakers runs out of the preset time. Under certain circumstances, the outage of
overloading branches may result in severer stress of power networks and ends up with having cascading
3
Figure 1: Cascading failure process of power transmission networks.
blackouts of power systems. To describe the cascading process, we introduce the concept of cascading
step. Essentially, a cascading step is defined as one topological change (e.g., one branch outage) of
power networks due to contingencies, human interferences or the branch overloads. The models of the
DC power flow, FACTS devices, HVDC links and protective relays are presented in sequence.
2.1 DC Power Flow Model
For high-voltage power transmission networks, the DC power flow equation is well qualified to describe
the quantitative relationship of injected bus power, branch susceptance and voltage angle as follows
Pb = AT diag(B)Aθ (1)
where A denotes the branch-bus incidence matrix [10] and θ refers to the vector of voltage angles. Pb
represents the vector of injected power on each bus. Additionally, B = (B1,B2, ...,Bn) is the susceptance
vector for branches, and each element Bi is given by
Bi =− 1XC,i+Xi , i ∈ In = {1,2, ...,n}
where XC,i denotes the reactance of TCSC equipped on Branch i, and Xi represents the original reactance
of Branch i. The DC power flow equation (1) can be solved as
θ =
(
AT diag(B)A
)−1∗
Pb
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Figure 2: Control diagram of TCSC on branches.
where the operator−1∗ denotes the operation of matrix inverse, which is defined in [11]. Then the vector
of transmission power on each branch can be computed by
Pe = diag(B)A
(
AT diag(B)A
)−1∗
Pb (2)
Notably, the generator bus connected to the largest generating station is selected as the slack bus, and
thus the power variation of slack bus accounts for a small percentage of its generating capacity.
2.2 FACTS Devices
FACTS devices can greatly enhance the stability and transmission capability of power systems. As an
effective FACTS device, TCSC has been widely installed to control the branch impedance and relieve
system stresses. The dynamics of TCSC is described by a first order dynamical model [12]
TC,i
dXC,i
dt
=−XC,i+Xre f ,i+ui, Xmin,i ≤ XC,i ≤ Xmax,i i ∈ In (3)
where Xre f ,i refers to its reference reactance of Branch i for the steady power flow. Xmin,i and Xmax,i are
the lower and upper bounds of the branch reactance XC,i respectively and ui represents the supplemen-
tary control input, which is designed to stabilize the disturbed power system [13]. For simplicity, PID
controller is adopted to regulate the power flow on each branch
ui(t) = KP · ei(t)+KI ·
∫ t
0
ei(τ)dτ+KD · dei(t)dt (4)
where KP, KI and KD are tunable coefficients, and the error ei(t) is given by
ei(t) =
 P
re f
e,i −|Pe,i(t)|, |Pe,i(t)| ≥ Pre fe,i ;
0, otherwise.
Here, Pre fe,i and Pe,i(t) denote the reference transmission power and the actual transmission power of
Branch i, respectively. Note that TCSC fails to function when the transmission line is severed. Figure 2
presents the diagram about the operation of TCSC via PID controller to reach the reference transmission
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Figure 3: Schematic diagram of monopolar HVDC link and its equivalent circuit.
power. First of all, we compute the error ei(t) between the actual power Pe,i(t) and the reference power
Pre fe,i . Next, the PID controller produces the control input ui(t) based on ei(t), which regulates the reac-
tance of TCSC on Branch i. Finally, the actual power Pe,i(t) will converge to the reference power P
re f
e,i as
time goes.
2.3 HVDC Links
In practice, the HVDC link works as a protective barrier to prevent the propagation of cascading outages,
and it is normally composed of a transformer, a rectifier, a DC line and an inverter (see Fig. 3). Actually,
the rectifier terminal can be regarded as a bus with real power consumption Pr, and the inverter terminal
can be treated as a bus with real power generation Pi. The direct current from the rectifier to the inverter
is computed as follows [14]
Id =
3
√
3(cosα− cosγ)
pi(Rcr +RL−Rci) ,
where α ∈ [pi/30,pi/2] denotes the ignition delay angle of the rectifier, and γ ∈ [pi/12,pi/9] represents
the extinction advance angle of the inverter. Rcr and Rci refer to the equivalent communicating resistances
for the rectifier and inverter, respectively. Additionally, RL denotes the resistance of the DC transmission
line. Thus the power consumption at the rectifier terminal is
Pr =
3
√
3
pi
Id cosα−RcrI2d , (5)
and at the inverter terminal is
Pi =
3
√
3
pi
Id cosγ−RciI2d = Pr−RLI2d . (6)
Notably, Pr and Pi keep unchanged when α and γ are fixed.
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2.4 Protective Relay
The protective relays are indispensable components in power systems protection and control. When
the transmission power exceeds the given threshold of the branch, the timer of circuit breaker starts to
count down from the preset time [4]. Once the timer runs out of the preset time, the transmission line is
severed by circuit breakers and its branch admittance becomes zero. Specifically, the vector of branch
susceptance at the k-th cascading step is given by
Bk = G(Pk−1e ,σ)◦F(Bk−1) (7)
where the operator ◦ denotes the Hadamard product, and σ = (σ1,σ2, ...,σn) represents the threshold
vector of transmission power on each branch. F(Bk−1) provides the vector of branch susceptance at the
(k−1)-th cascading step, and it updates constantly due to the dynamics of FACTS devices. Additionally,
the vector function G(Pk−1e ,σ) is used to characterize the branch outage as follows
G(Pk−1e ,σ) =

g(Pk−1e,1 ,σ1)
g(Pk−1e,2 ,σ2)
.
g(Pk−1e,n ,σn)
 ∈ Rn
And each element of G(Pk−1e ,σ) is a step function as follows
g(Pk−1e,i ,σi) =
 0, |Pk−1e,i |> σi and tc > T ;1, otherwise.
where T is the preset time of the timer in protective relays, and tc denotes the counting time of the
timer. Intuitively, the branch outage occurs when its transmission power is larger than the threshold and
meanwhile its timer runs out.
The evolution time of cascading failure is introduced to allow for the time factor of cascading black-
outs. Essentially, the time interval between two consecutive cascading steps basically depends on the
preset time of the timer in protective relays [4]. Thus, the evolution time of cascading failure is roughly
estimated by t = kT at the k-th cascading step.
3 Optimization Formulation
Since cascading blackouts result in the severe damage of power transmission, we focus on the power
transmission at the end of cascading outages and thus design the cost function as follows
J(δ ,Bm) =
1
2
‖Pme (δ )‖2 (8)
7
where Pme (δ ) denotes the vector of transmission power on each branch at the m-th cascading step, and
δ ∈ [δ , δ¯ ] characterizes the admittance change of the selected branch caused by the initial contingency.
Specifically, the vector of transmission power Pme (δ ) after the contingency can be computed by
Pme (δ ) = diag(B
m)A(AT diag(Bm)A)−1
∗
Pb
with
Bk = G(Pk−1e ,σ)◦F(Bk−1), k ∈ Im = {1,2, ...,m}.
As mentioned before, F(Bk−1) characterizes the dynamical adjustment of FACTS devices at the k-th
cascading step with B1 = B0 + δ . Notably, Pb refers to the vector of injected power on buses after
the rectifier and inverter terminals of HVDC links are treated as the loads and generators, respectively.
Therefore, the problem of identifying initial contingencies in power transmission networks is formulated
as
min
δ
J(δ ,Bm)
s. t. δ ≤ δ ≤ δ¯
Bk = G(Pk−1e ,σ)◦F(Bk−1), k ∈ Im
Pke (δ ) = diag(B
k)A(AT diag(Bk)A)−1
∗
Pb
(9)
where the objective function J(δ ,Y mp ) is defined in equation (8). Then it follows from the KKT conditions
that we obtain necessary conditions for optimal solutions to Optimization Problem (9) as follows [15].
Proposition 3.1. The optimal solution δ ∗ to Optimization Problem (9) with the multipliers µ1 and µ2
satisfies the KKT conditions
Pme (δ
∗)T
(
∂Pme
∂δ
|δ ∗
)
+µ1−µ2 = 0
δ ∗− δ¯ + x21 = 0
δ ∗−δ − x22 = 0
µ1(δ ∗− δ¯ ) = 0
µ2(δ ∗−δ ) = 0
µ1− y21 = 0
µ2− y22 = 0
(10)
where xi and yi, i ∈ I2 are the unknown variables.
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Proof. The KKT conditions for Optimization Problem (9) are composed of four components: stationary,
primal feasibility, dual feasibility and complementary slackness. Specifically, stationary condition allows
us to obtain
∂J(δ ,Y mp )
∂δ
|δ ∗+µ1−µ2 = 0,
which is equivalent to
Pme (δ
∗)T
(
∂Pme
∂δ
|δ ∗
)
+µ1−µ2 = 0
using equation (8). Additionally, the primal feasibility leads to δ ≤ δ ∗ ≤ δ¯ , which can be converted into
equality constraints
δ ∗− δ¯ + x21 = 0, δ ∗−δ − x22 = 0
with the unknown variables x1,x2 ∈ R. Moreover, the dual feasibility corresponds to µ1,µ2 ≥ 0, which
can be replaced by
µ1− y21 = 0, µ2− y22 = 0
with the unknown variables y1,y2 ∈ R. Finally, the complementary slackness gives
µ1(δ ∗− δ¯ ) = 0, µ2(δ ∗−δ ) = 0
This completes the proof.
Remark 3.1. To reduce the computation burden, the partial derivative of Pme with respective to δ can be
approximated by
∂Pme
∂δ
|δ ∗ ≈
Pme (δ ∗+ ε)−Pme (δ ∗)
ε
(11)
with the sufficiently small ε .
4 Numerical Method
To avoid the computation of partial derivatives and reduce computation costs, the Jacobian Free Newton
Krylov (JFNK) Method is employed to solve the system of nonlinear algebraic equations without forming
the Jacobian matrix. Essentially, the JFNK methods are synergistic combinations of Newton methods for
solving nonlinear equations and Krylov subspace methods for solving linear equations [16]. To facilitate
the analysis, we rewrite Equation (10) in matrix form
F (z) = 0 (12)
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where z= (δ ∗,µ1,µ2,x1,x2,y1,y2)T ∈ R7 denotes the unknown vector, and 0∈ R7 refers to a zero vector.
To obtain the iterative formula for solving (12), we compute Taylor series ofF (z) at zs+1 as follows
F (zs+1) =F (zs)+J(zs)(zs+1− zs)+O(δzs) (13)
with δzs = zs+1− zs. By neglecting the high-order term O(δzs) and settingF (zs+1) = 0, we obtain
J(zs) ·δzs =−F (zs), s ∈ Z+ (14)
where J(zs) represents the Jacobian matrix and s denotes the iteration index. Thus, solutions to Equation
(12) can be approximated by implementing Newton iterations
zs+1 = zs+δzs
where δzs is obtained by Krylov methods. First of all, the Krylov subspace is constructed as follows
Ki = span
(
rs, J(zs)rs, J(zs)2rs, ..., J(zs)i−1rs
)
(15)
with
rs =−F (zs)−J(zs) ·δzs0,
where δzs0 is the initial guess for the Newton correction and is typically zero [16]. Actually, the optimal
solution to δzs is the linear combination of elements in Krylov subspace Ki.
δzs = δzs0+
i−1
∑
j=1
β j ·J(zs) jrs (16)
where β j, j ∈ {1,2, ..., i−1} is obtained by minimizing ‖J(zs)δ zs+F (zs)‖2 with Generalized Minimal
RESidual (GMRES) method [17]. In particular, matrix-vector products in (16) can be approximated by
J(zs)rs ≈ F (z
s+ξrs)−F (zs)
ξ
(17)
where ξ is a sufficiently small value [18]. In this way, we avoid the computation of Jacobian matrix via
matrix-vector products in (17) while solving Equation (12).
Table 1 summarizes the JFNK method for solving Equation (12). First of all, we set the initial step
s = 0, the initial tolerance ε0 and the minimum tolerance εmin for evaluating the termination condition
of loop iterations. Then the residual rs is calculated in each iteration, which allows us to construct the
Krylov subspace Ki. For elements in Ki, the matrix-vector products are approximated by Equation (17)
without forming the Jacobian. Next, the gradient δzs for Newton iterations is obtained via GMRES
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Table 1: JFNK Method.
1: Set s = 0, ε0 and εmin satisfying ε0 > εmin
2: while (εs > εmin)
3: Calculate the residual rs =−F (zs)−J(zs) ·δzs0
4: Construct the Krylov subspace Ki in (15)
5: Approximate matrix-vector products in (16) using (17)
6: Compute β j in (16) with GMRES method
7: Compute δzs with (16)
8: Update zs+1 = zs+δzs
9: Update εs+1 = ‖δzs‖/‖zs‖
10: Update s = s+1
11: end while
Table 2: Contingency Identification Algorithm.
1: Select the disturbed branch
2: Set lmax, l = 0 and δ = 0
3: while (l < lmax)
4: Compute δ ∗ with the JFNK method
5: if (J(δ ∗,Bm)< J(δ ,Bm))
6: δ = δ ∗
7: end if
8: Update l = l+1
9: end while
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method. Finally, we update the tolerance εs and step number s after implementing the Newton iteration
for zs. And a new iteration loop is launched if the termination condition εs ≤ εmin does not hold.
Table 2 presents the explicit process of implementing Contingency Identification Algorithm (CIA).
First of all, we select a branch in power transmission networks to add the disturbance with the initial
value δ = 0, and the maximum iterative step lmax is specified with the initial iterative step l = 0. Then we
compute the optimal disturbance δ ∗ with the JFNK method. The disturbance value δ ∗ in (10) is saved
if it leads to the worse cascading blackout (i.e., J(δ ∗,Bm) < J(δ ,Bm)). The above algorithm does not
terminate until the iterative step l is larger than or equal to lmax.
Remark 4.1. Essentially, the proposed approach to identifying initial disturbances is universal, which
also applies to power distribution systems using the AC power flow model and more complicated pro-
tective mechanisms. The main difference lies in the computation of transmission power at the final
cascading step, i.e., Pme in Equation (10).
5 Simulation and Validation
In this section, we implement the proposed CIA in Table 2 to search for the disruptive disturbances on
selected branches of IEEE 118 Bus System [19]. The numerical results on disruptive disturbances are
validated by disturbing the selected branch with the computed magnitude of disturbance. Per-unit system
is adopted with the base value of 100 MVA in numerical simulations, and the power flow threshold for
each branch is specified in Table 3. The power flow on each branch is close to the saturation, although
it does not exceed their respective threshold. In this way, the power system is vulnerable to initial
contingencies, and thus is likely to suffer from cascading blackouts.
Figure 4 shows the normal state of IEEE 118 Bus System, which includes 53 generator buses, 64
load buses, 1 reference bus (Bus 69) and 186 branches. Branch 8 (red link connecting Bus 5 to Bus 8)
is randomly selected as the disturbed element of power networks. And the HVDC links are denoted by
blue lines including Branch 4 connecting Bus 3 to Bus 5, Branch 16 connecting Bus 11 to Bus 13 and
Branch 38 connecting Bus 26 to Bus 30. The maximum iterative step lmax is equal to 10 in the CIA.
Other parameters are given as follows: ε = 10−2 in Equation (11), εmin = 10−8 in the JFNK method,
δ = 0, δ¯ = 37.45 and m = 12. For simplicity, we specify the same values for the parameters of three
HVDC links as follows: Rci = Rcr = RL = 0.1, α = pi/15 and γ = pi/4. Regarding the FACTS devices,
we set Xmin,i = 0, Xmax,i = 10 and Xre f ,i = 0 for the TCSC dynamics, and KP = 4, KI = 3 and KD = 2
for its PID controller. Additionally, the reference transmission power Pre fe,i is equal to the threshold of
transmission power σi. We consider two preset values of the timer in protective relays, i.e., T = 0.5s and
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Table 3: Thresholds of the transmission power on each branch.
Power Flow Threshold Branch ID
7 32
6 18 31
5 7 8 9
4 1 12 13 14 21 33 36 37 96
3 11 15 41 51 141
2 3 5 6 10 17 19 20 22 23 25 26 27 28 29 30
2 34 39 42 43 54 62 90 93 94 97 98 99 104 105
106 107 108 126 127 137 139 163 178 179 183
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Figure 4: Initial state of IEEE 118 Bus System. Red balls denote the generator buses, while blue ones
stand for the load buses. Cyan lines represent the branches of power systems. In addition, the red line is
selected as the disturbed branch, and three blue lines are the HVDC links, including Branch 4, Branch
16 and Branch 38.
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Figure 5: Final configuration of IEEE 118 Bus System without FACTS devices.
T = 1s. Contingency Identification Algorithm is carried out to search for the disturbance that results in
the worst-case cascading failures of power systems. For the IEEE 118 Bus System without the FACTS
devices, the computed magnitude of disturbance on Branch 8 is 37.45, which exactly leads to the outage
of Branch 8. For the power system with the FACTS devices and the preset time of the timer T = 0.5s,
the computed disturbance magnitude is 36.77, while it is 35.98 for T = 1s.
Next, we validate the proposed approach by adding the computed disturbances on Branch 8 of IEEE
118 Bus Systems. Specifically, Fig. 5 demonstrates the final state of IEEE 118 Bus System with no
FACTS devices and T = 1s. The cascading process terminates with 95 outage branches and the cost
function value of 53.28 after 16 seconds, and the system collapses with 42 islands in the end. These 42
islands include 24 isolated buses and 18 subnetworks encircled by the dashed lines. In contrast, Figure 6
presents the final configuration of IEEE 118 Bus Systems with the protection of the FACTS devices and
T = 0.5s. The cascading process ends up with 40 outage branches and the cost function value of 102.56
after 10 seconds, and the power system is separated into 17 islands, which include 6 subnetworks and 11
isolated buses. Figure 7 gives the final state of power systems with the FACTS devices and T = 1s. It
is observed that the power network is eventually split into 3 islands (Bus 14, Bus 16 and a subnetwork
composed of all other buses) with only 6 outage branches and the cost function of 153.69. Note that
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the initial disturbances from CIA fail to cause the outage of Branch 8 in the end for both T = 0.5s and
T = 1s. The above simulation results demonstrate the advantage of the FACTS devices in preventing
the propagation of cascading outages. The larger preset time of timer enables the FACTS devices to
sufficiently adjust the branch impedance in response to the overload stress. And thus the less severe
damages are caused by the contingency for the larger preset time of timer.
Figure 8 presents the time evolution of outage branches in IEEE 118 Bus System as a result of
disturbing Branch 8 in three different scenarios. The cyan squares denote the number of outage branches
with no FACTS devices and T = 1s, while the green and blue ones refer to the numbers of outage
branches with the FACTS devices for T = 0.5s and T = 1s, respectively. The computed disturbances are
added to change the admittance of Branch 8 at t = 0s. With no FACTS devices, the cascading outage of
branches propagates quickly from t = 2s to t = 10s and terminates at t = 16s. When the FACTS devices
are adopted and the preset time of timer is T = 0.5s, the cascading failure starts at t = 2s and speeds up
till t = 8s and stops at t = 10s. For T = 1s, the cascading outage propagates slowly due to the larger
preset time of timer and comes to an end with only 6 outage branches at t = 8s. Together with protective
relays and HVDC links, the FACTS devices succeed in protecting power systems against blackouts by
adjusting the branch impedance in real time. More precisely, the number of outage branches decreases
by 57.9% with FACTS devices and T = 0.5s and decreases by 93.7% with FACTS devices and T = 1s.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the problem of identifying the initial contingencies that lead to cascad-
ing blackout of power transmission networks equipped with FACTS devices, HVDC links and protective
relays. An optimization formulation was proposed to identify the contingencies in the framework of non-
linear programming, and an efficient numerical method was presented to solve the optimization problem.
Numerical simulations were carried out on IEEE 118 Bus Systems to validate the proposed approach.
Significantly, the contingency identification algorithm allows us to detect some nontrivial disturbances
that lead to the severe cascading failure of power transmission networks, other than severing the branch.
It is demonstrated that the coordination of FACTS devices and protective relays greatly enhances the
capability of power grids against blackouts. In the next step, we will investigate the contingency identi-
fication problem for the AC-based power distribution systems with transient process.
15
Figure 6: Final configuration of IEEE 118 Bus System with FACTS devices and T = 0.5s.
Figure 7: Final configuration of IEEE 118 Bus System with FACTS devices and T = 1s.
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Figure 8: Time evolution of outage branches during cascading blackouts.
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